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1WHY IS THERE NO CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN POLAND – AND 
SO WHY SHOULD WE CARE?*
Tim Bale and Aleks Szczerbiak
Abstract
Despite the fact that almost all Poles are Roman Catholics and that religion has 
played an important part in contemporary Polish politics, no self-declared Christian 
Democratic party has been successful in post-1989 Poland. None of the currently 
successful Polish centre-right parties profile themselves as Christian Democratic, nor 
can they be labeled as such objectively. While superficially Poland looks like fertile 
ground for Christian Democracy, the factors that were crucial to the formation and 
success of Christian Democratic parties in post-war Western Europe were largely 
absent during the emergence of democratic, multi-party politics in post-1989 Poland. 
Of course, parties are never simply produced and sustained by 'cleavages': they are 
more than institutional responses to some kind of social demand. The formation and 
success, or otherwise, of Christian Democratic parties owes much to the inter-play 
between social realities and sponsors, on the one hand, and the institutional and 
ideological crafting of entrepreneurial politicians, on the other.
* The authors would like to thank Martyn Conway, Sean Hanley, Frances Millard and three anonymous 
reviewers for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.
2In the field of party  politics, there is an implicit expectation that the party  systems of 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) will over time come to resemble those of the 
Western half of the continent. True, there is evidence to suggest that  the differences 
between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe are as significant as the similarities, and may prove 
very persistent. But, superficially  at least, there appears to be some support for such 
an expectation.  After all, most CEE countries have parties that can be plausibly 
placed on the familiar dimensions (left-right, authoritarian-liberal etc.) and many  of 
them, rather conveniently, get together with their western counterparts in European 
party  federations or at least party groups within the European Parliament (EP). One of 
the obvious differences between the party systems of CEE and their Western 
counterparts, for example, is that there are no cases in the former of a Christian 
Democratic party  that could claim anything like the success enjoyed by  such parties in 
the latter in countries like Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and, before its 
implosion in the early 1990s, Italy.
One way of exploring that difference, and at the same time improving our 
understanding of party and party system formation as a whole, is to follow a trail 
blazed by Sombart and more recently  trod by Marks and Lipset (2001), whose aim 
was find out why there was no electorally  successful socialist alternative in the USA. 
Investigating a non-occurrence can help us in two ways.  Firstly, it can tell us more 
about what did happen in a particular time and place by  contrasting it with what did 
not.  Secondly, it  encourages us to reflect and improve on existing explanations of 
why similar things happened (or did not happen) in other times and places. The key  to 
doing both of these, of course, is not just to pick a case where something didn’t 
3happen but also to make sure that what didn’t happen might, prima facie, have been 
expected to occur (Mahoney and Goertz 2004).
While in most  countries in the relatively secular CEE region the non-occurrence or 
absence of a successful Christian Democratic party  might come as no surprise, there 
is one country in which, given the nature of its society and political divisions, one 
might have expected Christian Democracy, at least at first glance, to have gained a 
foothold and even to flourish. That  country  is Poland – a nation where practising 
Roman Catholics make up around 95% of the population, a large proportion of which 
is still employed in the agricultural sector that, along with church-goers, traditionally 
supplied continental Europe’s Christian Democratic parties with a core vote. This core 
vote cut across class and laid the foundations for a centre-right that stood out against 
the re-distributive politics of the left, the equally  secular politics of liberalism, and the 
capitalist politics of conservatism. When we look at Poland, however, there seems to 
be no such thing as a successful Christian Democratic party. This makes post-1989 
Poland a crucial case of a ‘non-occurrence’ in contemporary European party politics.
We begin by defining Christian Democracy, a necessary but not an easy task, 
especially because in recent years it has become something of a slippery fish.  We 
then go on to show both how ‘self-declared’ Christian Democratic parties have failed 
in post-1989 Poland and that currently  successful centre-right parties cannot 
convincingly  be called Christian Democratic. Next, we explore the factors that played 
an important part  in the initial formation and success of Christian Democratic parties 
in post-war, newly-democratic continental Europe, looking both at countries where 
4such parties did well (in particular, Italy and Belgium, but also the Netherlands and 
Germany) and at countries where it  failed to take hold (notably France). Following 
that, we explore which of those factors were more or less in play in Poland after the 
fall of the Communist regime. Finally, we examine how the findings from our case 
might contribute to our more general understanding of party formation and success.
Christian Democracy: how would we know it if we saw it?
How do we know if one or more parties in post-1989 Poland, or anywhere else for 
that matter, can convincingly be called Christian Democratic? What we need is an 
archetype that we can compare against. Scholars like van Kersbergen (1994) and 
Hanley  (1994) argue that Christian Democracy should be seen to possess a distinct 
ideological pedigree, comprising of at least five distinctive, core elements. These can 
be used as characteristics we might expect a party to possess in order that  we can 
categorise it as Christian Democratic. The elements should not be seen as a set of 
criteria that absolutely has to be fulfilled to the letter: we are talking, after all, about 
what Wittgenstein (2001[1953]) famously  termed ‘family resemblance’, namely 
categorisation that is not mathematically precise but nevertheless clearly meaningful 
and useful. On the other hand, a party doing or saying something that clearly  runs 
counter to one or more of the core elements cannot be categorised as Christian 
Democratic. Obviously, we must allow parties some leeway: even those Western 
European parties whose membership  of the family is beyond doubt have had to 
respond to challenges and contingencies (such as the collapse of their communist 
enemy and the emergence of neo-liberalism) which mean that they  are no longer 
5exactly  what they once were. Nonetheless, they  remain recognisably different from 
other parties on the right, and so too should the parties we examine in Poland.
The first  characteristic of a Christian Democratic party is a commitment to the idea of 
society as an organic whole – a commitment expressed in the linked ideas of ‘social 
personalism’ and ‘solidarism’ which imply  that individual rights and choices, and 
collective interests, only  gain meaning when framed within the context of a wider 
community. For the Christian Democrat, then, the central goal of politics is to 
promote harmonious interaction and eliminate tensions between different social 
classes and individuals through negotiation and social accommodation.
Secondly, Christian Democrats are traditionally strong supporters of the family as the 
key means of achieving this societal equilibrium. The family  is the cornerstone of the 
community  - the primary vehicle for the transmission of social values and an ideal 
tool for social regulation - and Christian Democrats direct a significant amount of 
effort into supporting familial structures. A family-oriented approach to social policy, 
is accompanied by  a concomitant emphasis on conservative social and cultural values, 
which means that there is also a deeply  traditionalist and moralistic thread running 
through Christian Democratic rhetoric. This finds expression in a limited tolerance of 
alternative lifestyles, which sometimes leads Christian Democrats to openly 
characterise single parenthood and homosexual relationships as a corrosive threat the 
traditional family and, consequently, to the community as a whole.
6Thirdly, in terms of socio-economic policy, Christian Democrats have normally 
supported some kind of ‘social capitalism’, best exemplified by the German ‘social 
market economy’. They shared with conservatives and liberals an essential (albeit 
qualified) belief in the beneficial power of a market-based economy, together with a 
conviction that private property constitutes an inviolable right and should be protected 
from an overly-interventionist state.  This notwithstanding, the latter is seen as having 
a duty to provide for all of its citizens, protect the weak in society and prevent 
entrenched social exclusion, as well as to intervene and regulate in order to prevent 
the development of an antagonistic relationship between capital and labour. From this 
duty flow (neo) corporatist structures and ‘continental’ welfare states.
Fourthly, Christian Democrat foreign policy is underpinned by a strong emphasis on 
trans-national, as well as domestic, reconciliation. Christian Democrats know that  the 
nation, alongside the family and voluntary  associations, is one of the different kinds 
of communities in which humankind fulfils itself, but reject  nationalism red in tooth 
and claw. This antipathy  derives partly  from their close association with the Roman 
Catholic Church with its universalistic claims, but also relates to a worldview rooted 
in mutual understanding and reciprocity between individuals and groups (or, as 
Hanley  (1994:8) neatly  puts it, “making strangers into friends”). Christian Democratic 
parties’ longstanding attachment to European integration as a means of overcoming 
nationalism flows logically  from this worldview – although clearly not even the most 
idealistic Christian Democratic statesman completely forgot (or forgets) about his 
country’s ‘selfish’ political and economic interests as the European project moved 
(and moves) forward.
7Fifthly, Christian Democratic parties’ programmes are explicitly rooted in and 
underpinned by  religiosity. Although Christian Democracy  is about the application of 
general Christian principles and values to the governance of the state rather the formal 
‘re-Christianisation of society’, Christian Democratic parties remain conscious of 
their religious origins and the values that they embody are clearly inspired by, and 
originate from, Christian ethics. First and foremost, Christian Democrats are in 
politics to express a Christian vision of humankind and its destiny. However, although 
they  may continue to enjoy close relations with (and sometimes the explicit  support 
of) the Catholic Church and its ancillary lay organisations, Christian Democratic 
parties are also self-consciously lay groupings and are not controlled by, and operate 
at arm’s-length from, the Church hierarchy.
Thus armed with a better idea of what we are looking for, we now go on to see if any 
of the currently successful centre-right parties in Poland can be called Christian 
Democratic, pausing initially to trace the ideology’s limited history  in that country 
and to examine the unimpressive record of parties that claimed it as their own.
Establishing the absence of Christian Democracy in contemporary Poland
Although all the main Polish parties (except for those on radical left) to emerge at the 
end of the Nineteenth Century – during the period when Poland was partitioned 
between Austria-Hungary, Prussia and Russia – made frequent references to Christian 
values in their programmes, Christian Democracy as a distinct political movement did 
8not enjoy widespread support. Nor were ‘self-declared’ Christian Democratic parties 
especially influential during the period of the inter-war Second Republic following 
the restoration of an independent Polish state in 1918 (Bender 1985: 335-6). In 1945, 
there was an attempt to revive the pre-war Christian Democratic Labour Party 
(Stronnictwo Pracy: SP) but it operated openly for only a short period and following 
persecution by the authorities, the last vestiges of independent Christian Democratic 
political activity in communist Poland ended in 1950.
The remnants of Christian Democratic political thought continued largely as one 
current of thinking within the Catholic secular associations that the communist 
authorities allowed to function in a stringently controlled form on the margins of 
political life. There were a number of attempts to revive an independent  Polish 
Christian Democrat movement during the communist period (Stępień 2000). 
However, the majority of Catholic activists clustered around the so-called 
‘ Z n a k ’ ( ‘ S i g n ’ ) m o v e m e n t a n d a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e ‘ Ty g o d n i k 
Powszechny’ (‘Universal Weekly’) newspapers - which operated semi-independently 
from, but tightly constrained by, the communist regime - rejected this idea, fearing 
that it would draw them too closely into official state structures and, ultimately, 
transform them into simply another ‘satellite’ organisation. There were also small 
groups of Christian Democratic activists involved in the democratic opposition 
movement at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s. However, these 
individuals and groupings played only a very marginal role in both the Solidarity 
movement and in subsequent attempts to revive Christian Democracy following the 
collapse of communism and emergence of pluralist, multi-party politics in 1989.
9The early 1990s saw numerous unsuccessful attempts to establish such ‘self-declared’ 
Christian Democratic parties (Gołoś 2000). Most of them were either completely  new 
parties that emerged from within the Solidarity  movement or attempts to revive 
historic parties that claimed continuity with the pre-communist and pre-war Polish 
Christian Democratic movement. The closest that post-1989 Poland came to the 
emergence of an electorally successful self-declared Christian Democratic party was 
the formation of Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność: AWS), a 
coalition of parties and political groupings on the centre-right  that was established in 
1996 under the aegis of the Solidarity trade union (Karatnycky 1998). Solidarity 
Electoral Action was an ideologically eclectic and heterogeneous political 
conglomerate including socially conservative trade unionists, (both economically 
interventionist and more liberal) Catholic nationalists and relatively secular liberal-
conservatives; although it  also contained a strong self-declared Christian Democratic 
element. It  won the September 1997 election with 33.83% of the votes and 201 seats 
(out of 460) and was the main governing party throughout the 1997-2001 parliament. 
Following the 1997 election, a new union-sponsored political party, the Solidarity 
Electoral Action Social Movement (Ruch Społeczny Akcji Wyborczej Solidarność: 
RS AWS) was set up  as a ‘self-declared’ Christian Democratic party and its 
programmatic declarations contained numerous references to Christian axiology. 
However, Solidarity Electoral Action’s spectacular 2001 election defeat, when it 
failed to secure parliamentary representation, precipitated a major crisis within the 
Social Movement, which was dissolved in 2004. 
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One party  that has sometimes been categorised as Christian Democratic and enjoyed 
medium levels of electoral and political success in the 1990s was the Christian 
National Union (Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe: ZChN). This party was 
formed in 1989 and developed into one of the most significant parties on the Polish 
right following the October 1991 parliamentary election when it spearheaded the 
Catholic Electoral Action (Wyborcza Akcja Katolicka: WAK) coalition that  emerged 
as the third largest parliamentary grouping securing 8.79% of the vote and 49 
deputies. As its name suggests, it was certainly a Christian-inspired party that: 
stressed its close links with the Catholic Church; argued that public policy should be 
rooted in Christian values and notions of ‘social solidarity’; and supported the family 
as the most effective guarantor of individual freedom, social stability and cohesion. 
However, the Christian National Union had a much more expansive approach towards 
promoting, and ensuring that the state reflected, Christian moral values than an 
archetypal Christian Democratic party, and sought institutional guarantees to underpin 
the Church’s influence over public life so that the Polish state had an explicitly 
Catholic character. The Christian National Union’s ideology was also characterised by 
a strong emphasis on national-patriotic themes, particularly  the importance it attached 
to ensuring that the state reflected Polish national and cultural traditions. This was in 
stark contrast to Christian Democratic parties’ traditionally ‘universalist’ approach, 
exemplified by their longstanding attachment to European integration as a means of 
overcoming nationalism. This makes it difficult to classify the Christian National 
Union as Christian Democratic.
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There were also a number of other very marginal ‘self-declared’ Christian Democratic 
parties in post-1989 Poland that faded quickly  into obscurity, such as Christian 
Democracy of the Third Republic of Poland (Chrześcijańska Demokracja III 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej: ChD III RP) party, set up by Lech Wałęsa in 1997, 
essentially  a vehicle for him to pursue his personal ambitions. There were also 
agrarian parties emanating from the Solidarity  movement that claimed to be directly 
inspired by Catholic social teaching or included the term ‘Christian’ in their name. 
However, these are more accurately classified as agrarian or agrarian-conservative, 
rather than Christian Democratic, parties. In other words, none of these attempts to set 
up ‘self-declared’ Christian Democratic parties in post-1989 Poland have been really 
successful.
Moreover, none of the main Polish right wing or centre-right parties currently 
operating in Poland has sought to profile itself self-consciously  as Christian 
Democratic. At the time of writing, the most significant centre-right parties are the 
Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość: PiS), Civic Platform (Platforma 
Obywatelska: PO) and the League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin: LPR), 
which secured 27% (155 seats), 24.14% (133 seats) and 7.97% (34 seats) of the vote 
respectively in the most recent September 2005 parliamentary election. But is it 
possible to categorise any of these parties as, at least ‘objectively’, Christian 
Democratic in the sense that they come close to the ‘ideal type’ outlined above?
At first glance, Law and Justice does, indeed, appear to bear a close resemblance to an 
archetypal Christian Democratic party. Its economic programme is infused with 
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‘social market’ rhetoric and the party  argued that it  was the state’s responsibility to 
build more solidarity  between those who had succeeded in the new capitalist Poland 
and those who felt that they had lost out from economic transformation. From the 
outset, the Law and Justice party  was a culturally conservative party  strongly 
committed to traditional social values, particularly  the importance of using social 
policy to support the family. It also argued that the state should recognise the 
importance of and respect Christian values, which it  felt provided an axiological 
underpinning for associational activity in the public sphere. However, the party never 
enjoyed explicit support from either the Catholic Church hierarchy or, to begin with at 
least, lay organisations. Although the party has increasingly made a clear pitch for the 
religious electorate through its programmatic statements and close association with 
the influential clerical-nationalist broadcaster Radio Maryja, the station is not an 
official Church organ. Moreover, although Law and Justice supported Polish 
accession to the EU, the party  also had a strong ‘Gaullist’ strand to its thinking, 
reflected in the fact that, having initially aligned itself with the Christian Democratic 
European People’s Party (EPP) trans-national party federation, Law and Justice 
subsequently  decided to join the ‘sovereignist’ ‘Union for a Europe of Nations’ 
grouping in the EP. Indeed, the party’s clearest  defining characteristic has always been 
a commitment to the radical reform of the Polish state and the creation of a new 
moral, political and social order. This made it difficult to categorise as an archetypal 
Christian Democratic party.
As part of its attempt to construct a broader appeal beyond its original ‘core’ liberal 
electorate, Civic Platform also sought to position itself as a socially  conservative party 
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and with a stronger national-patriotic discourse. This involved developing a more 
religiously informed dimension to its ideological and programmatic profile that 
shifted the party in the direction of Christian Democracy. Indeed, from the outset, 
Civic Platform was a member of the EPP and went on to join its EP grouping. 
However, Civic Platform’s economic programme emphasises the importance of 
competitiveness, sound public finances and low taxation rather than a ‘social market’ 
approach based on welfarism, state intervention and corporatism. At root, Civic 
Platform is a right-wing liberal or liberal-conservative, rather than an archetypal 
Christian Democratic, party.
As its name implied, the League of Polish Families is certainly a very strong 
supporter of conservative social values and strengthening the legal and economic 
position of the family. Axiologically, the party invokes Christian values directly  and 
explicitly to justify its strong opposition to homosexual marriage and adoption, 
euthanasia, cloning, and any attempts to liberalise Poland’s abortion laws; and all of 
these occupy  a prominent place in the party’s programme and rhetoric. The party 
portrays itself as representing an alternative to both collectivist and liberal approaches 
to political economy and claims to support a ‘social market’ programme, with a strong 
emphasis on policies to promote welfare and social protection. In fact, tone of the the 
League’s approach to economic policy is probably too overtly  anti-capitalist for a 
Christian Democratic party. Moreover, the party is identified with a particular 
nationalist strand of Polish Catholicism and, like the Christian National Union 
although even more so, the League fuses religious fundamentalism with radical 
nationalist rhetoric. Its hostility to the European project is exemplified by  the fact that 
14
its MEPs chose to join the radical Eurosceptic ‘Independence and Democracy’ 
grouping in the EP. Given its emphasis on the importance of defending national 
sovereignty against encroachment from international organisations, it is, therefore, a 
clerical-nationalist rather than a Christian Democratic grouping drawing more on the 
traditions of Roman Dmowski’s pre-war National Democracy movement (Naradowa 
Demokracja: ND - known as the ‘endecja’).
In summary, then, parties in post-1989 Poland that have called themselves Christian 
Democratic have thus far failed, while none of the country’s more successful centre-
right and right-wing parties can be called (or, indeed, call themselves) Christian 
Democratic. We now look for clues as to why by trying to understand the relative 
success and failure of Christian Democratic parties in a set of democracies that in 
their day were, like Poland, newly emerging from dictatorship and/or occupation
Accounting for variations in presence and performance: Christian Democracy in post-
war Europe
The only flaw in the otherwise exemplary combination of social science and historical 
method that is Kalyvas’ The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe (1996) is its 
author’s claim that there was a ‘remarkable continuity’ between the pre-war parties it 
focuses on and the Christian Democratic parties that came to dominate the politics of 
a number of West European countries for several decades after 1945. This idea is 
rejected by experts on the post-war period – a consensus that arguably calls into 
question (albeit implicitly) Lipset and Rokkan’s assertion that  the political formations 
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of the post-war period reflected the cleavage structures of the late Nineteenth and 
early Twentieth centuries.  The historian Martin Conway (1996: 11) insists that, 
‘“Christian Democrats” (of the pre-war era) were precursors of the post-1945 
Christian democrats in name only’. The political scientist Carolyn Warner (2000: 24) 
likewise maintains, ‘the post-war Christian democratic parties were not lifted from 
storage as a continuation of the pre-war Catholic or Christian democratic parties. 
Maintaining that they were...seriously distorts the process of post-war party 
formation.’
In short, in order to understand why Christian Democratic parties came about and 
why they came, at least in some countries, to be so successful, we have to look at  ‘a 
particular conjuncture’ (Conway 2003: 59) – the first few years after a regime change 
that saw totalitarian dictatorships or their puppet  governments replaced by 
democratically elected administrations. This does not mean, however, that we must 
give up  the search for generalisation and an explanatory framework that can be 
exploited in another time and another place, not least in a period that saw a similarly 
momentous regime change. In fact, a comprehensive survey of the literature on the 
early post-war development of continental Christian Democracy  reveals a number of 
factors associated with Christian Democratic party success, although (given that they 
were present to a greater or lesser degree and given that the skill displayed and the 
luck enjoyed by each party also mattered) the extent  of that  success still varied, of 
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course, between countries.1 Conversely, the absence or attenuation of those factors is 
associated with the lack of a significant Christian Democratic party. These are 
discussed below in what we believe is their order of importance.
1. A substantial (and preferably practising) Roman Catholic population.
‘There was’, as Conway (2003: 48) puts it, ‘no secret to the post-war electoral success 
of Christian Democracy: it relied primarily on the successful yoking of political 
choice to religious commitment.’ The higher the level of the latter, the easier it was to 
achieve the former. Italy and Belgium were almost entirely  Catholic and, while 
attendance at mass, varied between regions, on average it exceeded 40%.  In France, 
only around a quarter of the population were practising Catholics. Other countries 
where the Catholic population was lower, such as (West) Germany (nearly half) and 
the Netherlands (about a third), got over this hurdle, however, by incorporating or co-
operating with political Protestantism. Success of course also depended on a solid 
majority  of this Catholic population actually  voting for the Christian Democrats: this 
was almost  certainly achieved in Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands, where 
something approaching nine out of ten practising Catholics did so; such voting was 
reasonably solid in Germany, where about half of all practising Catholics voted for 
1 By ‘successful’  we mean those Christian Democratic parties that: in the wake of the first post-war 
elections and until at least the 1970s, regularly took between a third and two fifths of the national vote; 
were crucial components of most governments; and had no significant conservative competitor. 
Together with Conway (2003) and Warner (2000),  the following survey draws heavily upon: Buchanan 
and Conway (1996); Lamberts (1997); Kselman and Buttigieg (2003); Leonardi and Wertman (1989); 
Fogarty (1957); Evans (1999); and Pridham (1977).
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the Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union (Christlich-Demokratische 
Union–Christich-Soziale Union: CDU-CSU), but considerably  flakier in France. All 
parties, we should note, were almost certainly given a temporary boost by something 
of a post-war boom in a traditional Catholic religiosity that presumably offered some 
consolation for the miseries of war and occupation.
2. A real and pervasive fear of a victory (or takeover) by a militant secularist, anti-
clerical, egalitarian and potentially totalitarian left.
This was a widespread – and, given, say, the communist coup in Prague in February 
1948, a reasonable – anxiety  all over continental Europe. Anti-communism had 
become commonplace in the inter-war and war years, while in the post-war years 
many communist parties were given a boost by their association with resistance to 
German occupation and/or by material assistance from a recently triumphant Soviet 
Union. The apparent (if evanescent) unity  of those parties encouraged many to believe 
that only a similarly united effort could beat them back.
3. Bedrock support from a) newly-enfranchised female voters b) rural/agricultural 
sectors and c) the propertied middle-classes.
Although the reasons why can only  be guessed at (the usual suspects are the parties’ 
‘pro-family’ rhetoric and women’s relative religiosity), women, many of whom were 
voting for the first time in the aftermath of the war, seem to have provided significant 
support for the Christian Democrats. Unlike levels of Catholicity, however, there 
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seems to have been little variation between countries on this score. The same can be 
said for the other sources of core support – the so-called ‘rural-middle class alliance’ 
or ‘farmer-bourgeois alliance’, some of which had supported the authoritarian right in 
the inter-war years, but which in the post-war years helped push Christian Democracy 
away from a thoroughgoing social corporatism towards a more free-market economic 
policy, albeit one that preserved agriculture as a special case and looked to Europe to 
help matters.
4. Potential competitors on the right either a) de-legitimised by their participation or 
tacit acquiescence in totalitarian regimes or b) unwilling or unable to organise 
themselves rapidly.
Outside the Soviet Union, the responsibility  for the crimes of the inter-war 
dictatorships, and indeed for the war itself, lay fairly  obviously – if not always 
directly  or completely – with the conservative right. Indeed, so heinous were those 
crimes, there could be little thought, at least immediately, of the ‘successor parties’ 
that more peaceful transitions to democracy have produced. However, the fact that 
many Christian Democratic politicians had been persecuted and imprisoned by  right-
wing dictatorships and/or were involved in the patriotic resistance allowed them to 
present themselves as moderates untainted by  association with the previous regimes. 
In France, though, things were different. There, a centre-right alternative to Christian 
Democracy could have been constructed from the outset around de Gaulle had he not 
been reluctant  to get more directly involved straight away. Little surprise, then, that 
the creation of the Rally of the French People (Rassemblement du peuple français: 
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RPF) in 1947 saw mass defections from the (Christian Democratic) Popular 
Republican Movement (Mouvement Républicain Populaire: MRP), whose leaders 
declined to ‘break right’ with the Rally, instead carrying on a centre-left coalition.  In 
fact, right across Europe, the performance of Christian Democratic parties varied 
according to their capacity  to hold onto more unambiguously  right-wing electors and 
politicians - a capacity that varied according to institutional logic. Hence Italian 
Christian Democracy (Democrazia Cristiana: DC) started out well, but once it became 
evident that the electoral system would allow small authoritarian parties a foothold, it 
lost some support, although this was compensated for (as it was in Belgium until the 
national cleavage could be contained no longer) by essentially centrist 
governmentalism. The Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union, on the 
other hand, could bank on Germany’s high threshold to make voting for a more 
radical right-wing option seem like a waste of time.
5. A church hierarchy with high prestige and centralised organisation that, at crucial 
early elections, threw its weight and resources behind its chosen Christian 
Democratic party.
Warner’s (2000) valuable study reveals that the decision of the Church in some (but 
not all) countries to support a particular party strongly  helped ‘lock in’ that party as 
the main centre-right contender, notwithstanding the fact that the choice was 
sometimes faute de mieux to start  with and occasioned more than the odd regret 
afterwards. In Italy, once the Lateran Pacts had been re-cemented into the post-war 
constitution by Christian Democracy, which also engineered the exit from the 
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government of the left, the highly centralised and financially powerful Church ceased 
flirting with more authoritarian forces on the right and its mobilisation on the party’s 
behalf, especially  in 1948, was uncompromising. Similarly, the Belgian Church 
swung behind the Christian People’s Party-Social Christian Party (Christelijke 
Volkspartij-Parti Social Chrétien or CVP-PSC) and effectively  strangled a potential 
rival (the Democratic Belgian Union [Union Democratique Belge: UDB]) in its cot. In 
Germany, political euthanasia rather than infanticide was the order of the day: the 
relatively less powerful Church hierarchy was nonetheless instrumental in killing off 
the pre-war (Catholic) Zentrum the better to provide a sure start to the newcomer, the 
cross-confessional Christian Democratic Union – a party whose untainted brand 
seemed to offer a better chance of embedding the Church’s taxation and property 
rights, and its welfare operations, in the post-war order. In the Netherlands the break 
with the pre-war tradition of political Catholicism may have been less sharp, but the 
material and exhortational support  of bishops was almost as strong. In France, 
however, the Church hierarchy was, firstly, tainted by  association with Vichy, 
secondly, hamstrung by a powerful laic tradition that made it  difficult to argue against 
a separation of Church and state – and intervene in politics – without provoking a 
massive backlash, and, thirdly, in any case not the relatively  centralised, unitary  actor 
that its counterparts in other countries could claim to be. Consequently, in spite of the 
fact that the early signs for the Popular Republican Movement looked good, the 
Church hierarchy  would not, and to some extent could not, support the party  explicitly 
- a low profile approach that became all the lower once it became clear that the party 
would not only not give it what it wanted on crucial questions (like religious schools), 
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but that, unlike most of its counterparts in other European countries (at least in the 
early years), it was also prepared to govern in coalition with the left.
6. Support and campaigning on behalf of a Christian Democratic party by groups and 
associations in civil society.
If ever there was a golden age of the mass party, it was in the immediate post-war 
period. No less than many communist and social democratic parties, some Christian 
Democratic parties were part of a sub-culture and a network of associated institutions 
that spread the message and kept supporters loyal, although here again, there was 
variation between countries. Notwithstanding Mussolini, Italy’s lay  organisation 
Azione Cattolica (Catholic Action) retained branches in each of the country’s 24,000 
parishes that were mobilised to create the so-called Civic Committees that did direct 
electoral campaigning. Catholic trade unions also remained essentially loyal to 
Christian Democracy until the 1960s. The role of intermediary institutions in 
delivering welfare in Italy (and especially in the ‘pillarised’ societies of the 
Netherlands and Belgium) meant a continued role for what would now be called 
‘faith-based’ organisations - civil society groups which, in turn, worked to keep 
Christian Democratic parties strong and helped them maintain support across class 
lines. In Germany, however, Catholic associations, even though they gradually  re-
assumed a role in the delivery  of social and health services, had been rendered 
virtually  defunct by the Nazi regime. Moreover, the Christian Democratic Union-
Christian Social Union never developed a truly  organic link with the trade union 
movement. In France, Catholic Action survived the war, but stood very much at arm’s 
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length from the bishops and, fearing a backlash if it did get too involved in politics, 
decided to put its efforts into re-awakening the spirituality of ordinary people rather 
than helping a particular party. More secular interest groups, like the anti-communist, 
conservative farmers’ federation, quickly wrote off the Popular Republican Movement 
after it  pushed for a rationalisation of the agricultural sector, while the Christian trade 
union was sceptical about the party and keen to retain its autonomy.
7. A Christian Democratic party that delivers the basics to the Church but manages to 
achieve relative autonomy from the Church hierarchy and its more contentious policy 
demands.
Christian Democratic parties had to offer the Church something in return for its 
support but at the same time minimize the extent to which carrying out its agenda 
would cost them the support of non-confessional and/or moderate voters attracted 
primarily  by the welfarist centrism of ‘social Catholicism’ rather than any  religious 
zeal. This was not an easy  task at first: many bishops and cardinals were seized in the 
immediate post-war years with an ‘integralist’ desire to use the state to secure 
Catholic hegemony and the defeat of apparently sinful modern values, while some of 
the Church’s more contentious demands, especially on schooling, had considerable 
(and therefore tempting) potential to mobilise core supporters. In Italy, for instance, 
Christian Democracy managed to deflect  Vatican pressure for an alliance with 
monarchists and neo-Fascists by securing the Lateran Pacts and arguing that its 
coalition with moderate secular parties was the best way to defeat the ultimate enemy, 
communism - a holding operation that bought the party  enough time to get its 
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patronage politics up  and running. In Belgium, the more conciliatory ‘Christian’ 
replaced ‘Catholic’ in the party’s name, though its claim to be open to all those who 
supported its progressive, centrist social and economic policies was somewhat 
undermined by its willingness, during national crises over the monarchy  and then over 
the de-confessionalisation of education, to take the Church’s side.  The German 
Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union, however, resisted pressure to 
include the 1933 concordat and the confessional school system in the basic law, 
believing that it would alienate the mass following a true ‘people’s party’ on the right 
should be aiming for. And this more arm’s length relationship  with the Church was 
taken further – indeed probably too far – by the French Popular Republican 
Movement. It too saw its role as a broker or arbiter between parties trapped by 
economic interests and bipolar traditions; but it actively  refused to offset  the 
downsides of that role (the constant compromises, the blurred identity) with patronage 
politics or a continued association with the Church.
Christian Democracy in post-1989 Poland – the missing links
Only the first of these factors – a substantial, practising Roman Catholic population – 
appears to have been present unambiguously during the emergence of democratic, 
multi-party politics in the case of post-1989 Poland. Surveys taken in the early 1990s, 
found that 97% of Poles declared themselves to be Catholics, with nearly half of the 
population attending mass at least once a week, making Poland one of the strongest 
Catholic communities in Europe (Chan 2000: 179). Historically, the Church was felt 
to have played a crucial role in upholding and defending Polish national identity and 
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was an important  focus for opposition to the communist regime (Szajkowski 1983, 
Monticone 1986). Moreover, from the mid-1970s, when ‘only’ 75% of Poles declared 
themselves to be Catholic, Poland experienced a religious revival, particularly 
following the election of John Paul II to the papacy in 1978. So there were also clear 
analogies with the boom in traditional Catholic religiosity that parts of Western 
Europe experienced in the immediate post-Second World War period. At the end of 
1980s, the Church played an important role in facilitating the round-table negotiations 
that led to the collapse of communism and transition to democracy. All this meant that 
when the democratic breakthrough came in 1989 the Catholic Church was the most 
trusted and respected public institution in Poland.
That said, the early  1990s also saw the emergence of a secular, anti-clerical (but not 
totalitarian) left. The emergence of anti-clericalism was partly a reaction to the way 
that the Church moved quickly  to expand its influence in the public sphere, especially 
when parties sympathetic to its agenda gained substantial parliamentary 
representation following the October 1991 election (Eberts 1998). The Church saw a 
substantial erosion of its prestige and drop in its public approval ratings combined 
with a feeling that it had an excessive influence on public life. The communist 
successor Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej: SLD) exploited 
this growing public anxiety about perceived excessive clerical influence as one of the 
springboards for its return to power following the September 1993 parliamentary 
election and former communist Aleksander Kwaśniewski defeated Wałęsa in the 1995 
presidential election, in spite of Church’s fairly  open support for the incumbent. The 
clerical-secular divide that emerged as a major source of political divisions in Poland 
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in the early  1990s corresponded closely  to frequency  of Church attendance with 
regular church-goers believing that the Church should play an active role in politics 
and more sceptical, less devout Catholics and non-believers advocating separation of 
Church and state. This clerical-secular divide developed into an important and 
sustainable determinant of party identification and voting behaviour, and combined 
(and overlapped) with the closely linked factor of attitudes towards the communist 
past to form a ‘historical-cultural’ axis that  dominated party competition in post-
communist Poland throughout the 1990s (Grabowska 2004).
In the early  1990s, there did, therefore, appear to be both a strong potential social base 
for a Christian Democratic party in Poland and, given the emergence of a resurgent 
anti-clerical left, a clear incentive for the Church hierarchy  to actively promote a party 
that could protect its interests. What then were the missing links that  meant that such 
a party did not emerge?
In the first place, the social constituencies that provided the bedrock support for 
Western Christian Democracy were either missing in post-1989 Poland or Polish 
Christian Democrats faced serious electoral competition for their votes. Female voters 
in post-communist Poland were not necessarily any more likely  to vote for Christian 
Democratic or Christian parties, or indeed other centre-right parties, than they were to 
support liberal or social democratic ones. For sure, a third of Poles lived in rural 
areas, with (although estimates vary on the precise figure) one-fifth of the workforce 
employed in agriculture, the overwhelming majority of them as peasant smallholders. 
This substantial rural-agricultural electorate could have provided Polish Christian 
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Democracy with a potential social base of support. However, unlike their Western 
post-war counterparts, Polish Christian Democrats faced significant competition for 
this electorate from the outset, from: other centre-right parties, the ex-communist/
social democratic left and, perhaps most significantly, agrarian parties. Indeed, 
initially it was the Polish Peasant Party, formed in 1990 as the successor to the former 
communist ‘satellite’ United Peasant Party (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe: ZSL), 
that emerged as the most significant party among this segment of the electorate. The 
Peasant Party  always remained, at root, an interest-based ‘class’ party wedded to a 
peasantist ideology, known as ‘neo-agrarianism’ in its modernised form, rather than a 
values-based (proto) Christian Democratic movement. As for Poland’s middle class-
bourgeois voters, their identity and their interests were by  no means as clear as they 
had been in post-war Western Europe, particularly during the early years of the post-
communist transformation. Indeed, in so far as the professional middle classes and the 
business community represented an objectively identifiable socio-economic 
constituency  in the early 1990s, evidence suggests that they were as likely  to vote for 
liberal parties (more unambiguously committed to promoting a low-tax, free market 
programmes), traditional conservative parties and even the social democratic left, as 
they were to vote for Christian Democrats.
Running counter to the fourth factor identified above, there were many other, equally 
credible, political alternatives to Christian Democracy available on the centre-right in 
post-1989 Poland. Christian Democracy was only one of many ideological currents 
that existed within the Solidarity movement including: conservatism, (clerical and 
more secular) nationalism and (social and conservative) liberalism together with a 
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(much weaker) social democratic strand. A plethora of new parties, therefore, emerged 
from within it in 1989-91. Moreover, the record of Christian Democratic activists 
during the communist period was a somewhat ambiguous one. True, many of the 
leaders of post-1989 self-declared Polish Christian Democratic parties had impeccable 
records of activity in the Solidarity movement and could, like their post-war West 
European counterparts, present themselves as untainted by association with the 
previous non-democratic regime. But so could many of the other party-forming elites 
on the centre-right, and they too were, to a greater or lesser extent, also prepared to 
help  advance the Catholic Church’s political agenda. Moreover, many of those 
involved in early attempts to re-activate Christian Democracy  in post-communist 
Poland, such as the Christian Democratic-Labour Party, were linked with the 
collaborationist ‘neo-Znak’ movement, so lacked the prestige of association with the 
Solidarity movement. At the same time, most of the Catholic intellectuals in the more 
credible Tygodnik Powszechny/Znak milieu who had worked closely with the 
democratic opposition, such as the first non-communist premier in post-1989 Poland 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, were not involved in attempts to establish Christian Democratic 
parties after 1989. 
While, like its counterparts in post-war Western Europe, the Polish Catholic Church 
certainly enjoyed high prestige and had a good organisational structure, its hierarchy 
was unwilling to throw its moral weight  and resources unambiguously behind a single 
pro-clerical party, Christian Democratic or otherwise, and eliminate its competitors – 
the fifth factor identified above. For sure, one of the reasons for the anti-clerical 
backlash in the early 1990s was the fact  that the Church was felt to have intervened 
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too overtly in electoral politics, with some leading clergymen openly identifying 
themselves with various post-Solidarity, pro-Church parties. In fact, the closest that 
the Church came to an official endorsement was in the October 1991 parliamentary 
election, when the hierarchy at least gave the impression that it was openly  supporting 
a number of Church parties, specifically the Christian National Union-dominated 
Catholic Electoral Action coalition (Rydlewski 1993: 205-9). However, there are 
conflicting accounts over the role that  the Church played in the 1991 election, and the 
Episcopate’s formal position, as it was in every post-1989 election, was not to identify 
with or support any particular parties or candidates. Moreover, the Church learnt from 
its mistakes in the early 1990s and the Church hierarchy maintained more disciplined 
neutrality in subsequent Polish parliamentary and presidential elections.2
In Solidarity - a large, anti-communist and strongly pro-Catholic trade union rooted in 
conservative social values - any putative Polish Christian Democratic party certainly 
had the kind of strong potential civil society ally that its counterparts in post-war 
Western Europe benefited from. However, unlike in post-war Western Europe, where 
Catholic trade unions (at least  initially) threw their weight solidly behind Christian 
Democratic parties, Solidarity was unwilling to support or campaign on behalf of any 
of the ‘post-Solidarity’ centre-right parties, including the Christian Democratic ones. 
As noted above, the union decided eventually to join the post-Solidarity parties in 
sponsoring the formation of Solidarity  Electoral Action in 1996, and then the 
Solidarity Electoral Action Social Movement that emerged in 1997 to take over the 
2  Although, the Radio Maryja broadcaster continued to play a very active and controversial role in 
Polish electoral politics and individual clergymen campaigned openly for specific candidates and 
parties.
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union’s political functions. However, the Social Movement developed as a largely 
non-ideological ‘party of power’ at arms-length from the union. Together with the 
other parties that comprised the Solidarity Electoral Action coalition, it disintegrated 
following the 2001 election and, for its part, the union decided eventually to withdraw 
from electoral and party politics chastened by its bad experiences with Solidarity 
Electoral Action.
In some senses, the seventh and final explanatory factor identified above, that Western 
Christian Democratic parties delivered the basics to the Church while managing to 
achieve relative autonomy from the Church hierarchy and its more contentious policy 
demands, was simply irrelevant in the Polish case. For one thing, no self-declared 
Christian Democratic party ever achieved enough electoral support to find itself in a 
position where it could ‘deliver’ for the Church in this way. For another, the Church 
was, broadly speaking, able to achieve nearly all of its political objectives without 
having to ‘pick a winner’. This was partly because, to a greater or lesser extent, 
virtually  every centre-right party in post-1989 Poland stressed its commitment to 
Christian values and promoted policies sympathetic to the Church’s social teachings 
and political agenda anyway. Moreover, the Church also, as Korbonski (2000: 144) 
put it, ‘succeeded in deterring the anti-Church opposition’ from attempting to roll 
back its gains. It was, for example, able to construct a hegemonic discourse accepted 
by some sections of the secular centre-left that the 1992 abortion law represented a 
‘compromise’ solution that  should not be unpicked; in spite of the fact  that it was one 
of the most restrictive in Europe. An interesting example of the way that the Church 
was able to shift the terms of the political debate in its favour came during the 2003-4 
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negotiations on the EU constitutional treaty, when even the secular left governments 
led by non-believers Leszek Miller and Marek Belka made inclusion of references to 
Europe’s Christian heritage in the treaty’s pre-amble one of Poland’s core negotiating 
demands.
Conclusion and Discussion
No self-declared Christian Democratic party has been successful in post-1989 Poland. 
None of the currently ‘successful’ Polish right wing or centre-right parties has self-
consciously  sought to profile itself as Christian Democratic nor do any of them fit the 
ideal type of an archetypal Christian Democratic party that  we set out in our five-
point model. A close examination of the period after the fall of the communist regime 
found that only the first of seven factors identified as crucial to the success of a 
Christian Democratic party  – a substantial, practising Roman Catholic population – 
appeared to have been present unambiguously during the emergence of democratic, 
multi-party politics. A second factor – fear of a takeover by a militant  secularist, anti-
clerical, egalitarian and potentially  totalitarian left – also existed, but only in 
attenuated form. None of the other five factors identified were present in Poland, or 
only in a very limited or qualified form. That this was the case, however, was very 
much a matter of agency and contingency as well as structure.
At this point, it is worth bringing in, albeit briefly, two West European countries, 
namely Spain and Ireland, where Christian Democracy failed to take off in anything 
like its archetypal form despite the fact that  it might have been expected to at first 
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glance. In neither country, of course, were all the factors that gave rise to take off 
fulfilled.  In Spain, for example, after years of trying to escape its close identification 
with the Francoist regime, the Church was not keen to re-enter politics, and in any 
case ‘the Left in the new democracy was not openly anti-religious, nor militantly anti-
clerical’ (Matuschek 2004: 245-7). Consequently, the centrist Union of the 
Democratic Centre (Unión de Centro Democrático: UCD), which governed Spain in 
the first few years of democracy before being squeezed out of politics by  the 
Socialists on the left  and a transformed Francoist  successor party on the right, may 
have temporarily  subsumed self-styled Christian Democrats (many of whom 
eventually ended up in the aforementioned Francoist  successor party); but it never 
convincingly  nor consistently defined itself as a Christian Democratic party (Gilmour 
2005). One can also argue that, as in Poland, the ‘strategic errors’ and ‘misguided 
campaign(s)’ of political actors unwilling to settle their differences and reconcile their 
ambitions, played a large part in the story  (Matuschek 2004: 247). Moreover, in both 
Spain and Ireland, national-patriotic themes merged with Catholicism to produce a 
political discourse on the centre-right that in some ways precluded classical Christian 
Democracy: in Ireland as a reaction to British colonialism, and in Spain to the 
perceived desire of ‘historic nationalities’ to break up the country.
Finally, how do these findings feedback into our more general understanding of party 
formation and success? The idea that parties are produced and sustained by cleavages 
continues to cast a long shadow over our understanding of these phenomena. 
Underlying the argument is the idea that  parties are institutional responses to, and 
expressions of, some kind of social (and often socio-economic) demand. As those 
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demands, or their strength, wax and wane, then older parties lose their strength and 
even die off, while new parties are founded that replace, or at least eat into, their 
support. In the last decade or so, however, political scientists have begun to question 
and qualify  what Panebianco (1988: 3) terms ‘the sociological prejudice’, possibly (if 
not always consciously) spurred on by the formation and development of parties and 
party  systems in Central and Eastern Europe. The latter, after all, often cannot be 
readily traced back to ‘cleavages’ in the sense that we have come to understand them 
in established Western democracies. In other words, they owed as much to agency, 
and to institutions, as to structure.
Both our own case study from the same region and our exploration of Christian 
Democratic success in the post-war era confirm that this questioning and qualifying of 
underlying implicit assumptions is indeed warranted. Parties do not, of course, float 
free from society either in the abstract or in the particular. What Panebianco calls 
‘sponsors’, institutions that link party  and society and often provide material and other 
resources, are important: the choices of both Church and Catholic lay  groups were 
obviously crucial to the parties studied here. But the formation and success of the 
latter owes much to the inter-play between those social realities, those sponsors, and 
the institutional and ideological crafting of entrepreneurial politicians, whether they 
were part of the parties we looked at or their competitors. Even if it was first pointed 
out to us by Schattschneider (1960) almost fifty years ago, and again by  Sartori 
(1990[1969]) less than a decade after him, we continually  need to remind ourselves 
that what happens (or does not happen) to parties and party  systems requires a 
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political explanation, and one that recognises the inter-action between demand and 
supply.
Mair (2006: 372), in the course of a more recent piece that  aims to rescue the concept 
of cleavages from the sociological determinism into which it has been allowed to fall, 
makes a similar point. Moreover, to support his position he quotes Kalyvas to the 
effect that ‘Confessional parties were not the historically predetermined and automatic 
reflection of pre-existing identities and conflicts, nor were they  the emanation of 
structural, economic, or political modernization. They were instead a contingent 
outcome of the struggle among various organizations facing a multitude of challenges 
under tight constraints’. The ‘non-occurrence’ or ‘failure’ of a viable Christian 
Democratic party in post-communist Poland, every  bit as much as the appearance and 
success of such parties in some countries in post-war Western Europe, illustrates the 
essential truth of that important observation.
This same combination of agency and constraint also means that parties try  hard to 
adapt to and even to shape circumstances that are by no means all of their own 
making. In order to survive and even prosper in countries like Belgium, Germany and 
the Netherlands, Christian Democratic parties have had to move on from the 
archetype in the last decade or so. Even if it  is too early  to say that they  have 
metamorphosed into secular conservative parties (Gerard and Van Hecke 2004: 
308-12; Duncan 2006), both individual Christian Democratic parties and transnational 
party  family groupings have attempted to cope in a more secular, market-driven age 
by adopting a more ideologically flexible and organisationally  expansive approach. 
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This ‘moving target’ raises an obvious contemporary  question, namely  to what extent 
do those centre-right parties that are currently successful in Poland resemble not the 
‘classic’ archetype that we discuss here but instead the arguably attenuated version 
that exists in twenty-first century Western Europe? Although this is a question beyond 
the scope of this paper, it is one that merits further research.
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